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Executive Summary    
The World Bank's World Development Report 1995: Workers in an Integrating World 
(WDR) afforded an opportunity for the World Bank to provide leadership on a central 
issue that faces both its borrowing and non-borrowing member countries: how the 
increasing competition of countries for the same pool of investment capital, particularly 
for the purpose of producing manufactured goods, can be reconciled with the interests of 
workers in industrialized countries and countries at lesser stages of development.    
Instead of providing leadership, the report is a major step backward. It (a) rejects linking 
internationally recognized, or core, worker rights -- the right of free association, to 
bargain collectively and to strike -- to international trade and investment agreements, a 
major initiative of the Clinton Administration; (b) blames urban workers in developing 
countries, who are fortunate enough to organize themselves into unions for the purpose of 
improving their wages and workplace conditions, for holding back less-favored workers 
in rural and urban areas; © is so fearful of the "monopolistic" power of unions that it 
recommends a labor-relations regime of decentralized bargaining to minimize union 
negotiating leverage with employers and governments; (d) attributes growing 
unemployment primarily to inflexible labor markets, onerous regulations, and minimum-
wage and health and safety provisions that increase costs for employers.    
What is missing from the WDR is any understanding of the imbalance in power between 
employers and workers in too many of the Bank's borrowing member countries and the 
consequent pervasive abuse of worker rights in such "model" World Bank borrowers as 
Mexico and Indonesia. Indeed, the Bank refuses to recognize the nexus between the 
development model promoted by the Bank, with its dependence upon attracting foreign 
direct investment (FDI), and labor abuses that are endemic among its principal borrowers. 
   
The U.S. Congress has directed the Secretary of the Treasury to instruct the U.S. 
Executive Director in each international financial institution governed by the legislation 
to use the "voice and vote" of the United States in each institution to encourage 
borrowing countries to "guarantee internationally recognized worker rights" as defined in 
the 1988 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (U.S. Congress, 1994). Unfortunately, 
that direction is not reflected in the World Bank's World Development Report 1995.  
World Employment 1995, a contemporaneous publication of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO), is in striking contrast to the WDR and calls into question the Bank's 
analysis and recommendations.    
A. LINKING WORKER RIGHTS AND TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
AGREEMENTS  
The WDR rejects linking core, or basic, internationally recognized worker rights to trade 
and investment agreements (p. 6). Those rights are generally understood to mean, as a 
minimum, the rights of workers to (a) free association, (b) bargain collectively and © 
strike. Sometimes prohibitions on forced labor, limitations on child labor, a minimum 
wage and a safe workplace are also referred to as basic worker rights.    
The report states that the "real danger of using trade sanctions as an instrument for 
promoting basic rights is that the trade-standards link will become hijacked by 
protectionist interests, attempting to preserve activities rendered uncompetitive by 
cheaper imports... Low-cost...unskilled labor is the main comparative advantage of poor 
countries. Differences in endowments are the very basis of international trade..." (p. 79). 
Pressure for such linkage, states the report, comes from a "small but vocal minority who 
fear that they will lose from the introduction of new technologies, the growth of 
international trade, and movements of capital and people across national boundaries," 
(pp. 4-5). And, this, according to the report, "has led to a proliferation of protectionist 
demands, many of them under the guise of demands for fair trade and a level playing 
field as a precondition for free trade..." (p. 50).    
This attitude is in striking contrast to the ILO report. World Employment 1995 is as 
positive as is the WDR as to the potential benefits of FDI and a free-trade and investment 
regime for the world economy and individual nations (p. 9, para. 14). But it states clearly 
what the WDR never admits: "There is, however, the danger that globalization will have 
negative effects on labor standards. The increased foot-looseness of MNEs, combined 
with pressures to attract and retain foreign investment could lead to a debasement of labor 
standards. This makes it important to give fresh impetus to cooperative international 
action to protect them" (p. 10, para. 19).    
That average real wages in the United States have stagnated for the past twenty years, 
with younger and non-educated workers experiencing significant reduction in earnings, is 
now well established. (Mishel and Bernstein, 1994, chapter 3). More recent academic 
studies disagree as to the relative importance of foreign competition as a cause of this 
stagnation (see Belman and Lee 1995 for a survey of this literature). Whatever the 
academic disagreements, American workers perceive that companies are more willing to 
use foreign competition and the threat of moving production to low-wage foreign 
jurisdictions to achieve concessions in collective bargaining. Even Wall Street financiers 
acknowledge the role of foreign competition on the downward pressure on U.S. wages in 
highly visible key sectors of the economy: " Foreign competition has affected blue-collar 
workers in the U.S. more severely because import pressures tend to be concentrated in 
durable goods industries such as autos and steel, which employ a disproportionate 
number of blue-collar workers at historically higher (and in many cases uneconomic) 
wages" (Rattner, 1995).    
Ten years ago, the Morgan Guaranty Trust Company's World Financial Markets report 
observed, "The long run shift of comparative advantage in manufacturing to the NICs 
helped them penetrate the U.S. domestic market even before the dollar's rise. U.S. 
manufacturer's are keenly aware of the cost savings attainable through contracting for 
production in low wage areas abroad." (Morgan Guaranty, 1985, p. 9). And the report 
drew a direct relationship between this tendency to relocate American production abroad 
and the stagnation of real wages in the United States: "[A]verage real wage gains have 
been negligible, maintaining their stagnation of the last ten years or more. Foreign 
competition has been the key factor" (Morgan Guaranty, 1985, p. 9).    
The WDR notes that "[r]ecently most of the expansion of multinational corporations has 
occurred in developing countries: 5 million of the 8 million jobs created by MNCs 
between 1985 and 1992 were in the developing world" (p. 62). More recent flows, 
observes the report, "have tended to be searching for cheaper export platforms" (p. 62). 
And this tendency has contributed to a major shift in the composition of developing 
countries' exports: the share of manufactures in developing countries' exports tripled 
between 1970 and 1990 from 20 percent to 60 percent (WDR, p. 51).   
The perception among American workers of the link between the relocation of production 
abroad and wage stagnation has fueled a deep disenchantment with a free-trade and 
investment regime among American workers (Rowen, 1994). Competition for investment 
capital is often cited by officials in developing countries as the reason they are unwilling 
to modify their labor-relations controls. (Elliott-House, 1993, interview with Prime 
Minister of Malaysia). But it also feeds the sentiment among workers in industrialized 
countries that the international economy today is not simply a function of different 
national endowments: rather, it represents a deliberately rigged set of institutional labor-
market institutions and practices in developing countries to gain competitive advantage 
and these arrangements have been taken advantage of by multinational corporations 
(MNCs) to gain bargaining leverage with their employees in industrialized countries.    
The World Bank has accentuated this competition. It has conditioned its lending upon 
borrowing countries removing obstacles to the entry of foreign capital, particularly FDI, 
but it has not, at the same time, attempted to assure core worker rights. It has thus seemed 
to implicitly condone the abuse of worker rights where the borrowing country has 
otherwise embraced recommendations of the World Bank for an open trade and 
investment regime. (Levinson, 1994)    
(I) The Relevance of the NAFTA    
It is against this background that the linkage by the Clinton Administration of worker 
rights to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) must be understood. The 
issue was particularly acute for candidate Bill Clinton since American workers and their 
unions were traditionally an important part of the Democratic Party. President George 
Bush had signed an accord with the President of Mexico, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, for 
the creation of the NAFTA. Challenged by Bush to state his position on the Agreement, 
Clinton, in a speech on October 4, 1992 at North Carolina State University in Raleigh, 
North Carolina, set out the conditions for his support of the NAFTA: parallel agreements 
that would commit Mexico to enforce its own laws with respect to basic worker rights 
and protection of the environment (Clinton, 1992).    
Mexico's constitution and labor laws, as well as international commitments, nominally 
guaranteed these rights, most importantly the rights of free association and collective 
bargaining and the right to strike. In practice, however, these rights were severely 
constrained by a labor-relations regime that frustrated the organization of truly 
independent trade unions and vested real power in a labor confederation, the 
Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), which was closely allied to the governing 
party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).    
By not calling for uniform labor standards among the signatory parties to the NAFTA 
(the U.S., Mexico and Canada), Clinton avoided difficult questions of national 
sovereignty. He was able to persuade organized labor's leaders to refrain from 
condemning the NAFTA and to await the outcome of the negotiation of the labor parallel 
agreement, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC).    
American labor seemed to accept that it was no longer feasible to simply oppose imports 
or obstruct free-trade and investment agreements and that the best way to protect the 
interests of American working men and women in the NAFTA context was to support 
effective labor organization in Mexico. Particularly in the more sophisticated export 
sector of Mexican industry, effective unions could bargain for a greater share of 
productivity gains and, over time, narrow the wage and benefits gap with American 
workers. MNCs would be on notice that they could no longer depend upon an oppressive 
labor-relations regime to assure a docile workforce.    
The fate of the American and Mexican workers were deemed to be complementary rather 
than antagonistic. The way seemed clear for an historic accommodation that would make 
American organized labor part of a new broad coalition that could support an 
international free-trade and investment regime that guaranteed core worker rights. (A 
similar accommodation appeared feasible with respect to the environment.)    
The NAALC as finally negotiated was disappointing. The critical issue was whether 
violation of the core worker rights, the industrial-relations provisions, by one of the 
Parties by persistently failing to enforce its own laws could lead to sanctions under the 
grievance provisions of the NAALC. Originally, the first U.S. drafts did so provide, but 
objection by the Mexican negotiators and strong resistance by the MNCs with 
investments in Mexico led the Clinton Administration to withdraw its proposal.    
The Agreement in its final version merely provided that alleged industrial-relations 
violations could be heard by the National Administrative Offices (NAOs) of each 
country, which were to be established under the NAALC, and that the Party alleging such 
a violation could request consultation with the offending Party. (Alleged violations by a 
Party of minimum-wage, health and safety and child-labor provisions of its own laws 
could ultimately lead to sanctions under the grievance provisions of the NAALC.) 
However, the chief Mexican negotiator assured Mexican entrepreneurs that the grievance 
procedures were so complex that it was unlikely that they would ever be invoked 
(Negrete, 1993).    
The capitulation by the Clinton Administration on this central point of the NAALC 
negotiation led the leadership of organized labor and other grass roots movements in the 
country to a unified stance in opposition to the NAFTA. The opportunity to forge a broad 
consensus in American society on how to confront a new international economy in which 
the barriers to trade and investment were falling throughout the world without prejudicing 
the interests of American workers and their counterparts in the developing countries was 
lost.    
Nevertheless, the NAFTA debate in American society, not just in the Congress, placed 
this issue on the national agenda. However disappointing the result in the NAALC 
negotiation, the Clinton Administration did succeed in establishing the principle that 
labor and environmental considerations were an integral part of the investment 
environment, as legitimately subject to negotiation in trade and investment agreements as 
intellectual property rights of corporations.    
President Clinton has said, "While we continue to tear down anti-competitive practices 
and other barriers to trade, we simply have to ensure that our economic policies also 
protect the environment and the well-being of workers. And as we bring into the orbit of 
global trade people who can benefit from the investment and trading opportunities we 
offer, we must ensure that their policies benefit the interests of their workers" (Clinton, 
1994).    
(ii) The European Social Charter    
The NAFTA debate in the United States paralleled an equally fundamental debate in the 
European Community over a "Social Charter", mutual commitments of the members on a 
common set of social standards so as to avoid "social dumping", the deliberate 
maintenance of degraded social standards for competitive advantage. (Eleven of the 
twelve member countries agreed to negotiate such a Charter, the exception being Great 
Britain.) A conservative French Prime Minister introduced the proposition that France 
and, by implication, the Community should not indiscriminately accept imports from 
countries that egregiously abuse worker and, more generally, human rights; he also joined 
with the United States in proposing that respect for core worker rights be included in 
future GATT negotiations.  
In the major industrial countries, with the exception of Japan, a profound debate has 
opened within society as to how to prevent an international economic regime and 
competition for investment capital from undermining domestic labor (and environmental) 
standards. Both in the United States and the Western European countries there is a 
growing realization that this is more than a narrow question of economic competition, 
although it is that as well.    
More important, it is a central component of social and political stability. If a substantial 
part of the population increasingly comes to feel that it has been economically displaced 
by international competition that does not adhere to minimum common standards of 
internationally accepted worker (and human) rights, then it is likely to became a 
permanently aggrieved segment of society with incalculable social and political 
consequences. The NAALC and the European Social Charter were an attempt to 
reconcile these concerns while recognizing the different levels of development and wages 
in a diverse international economy.    
These measures said to MNCs and governments in developing countries that they could 
not rely on repressive labor-relations practices to assure for competitive advantage a low-
wage industrial production regime, but would have to negotiate with workers through 
their representatives in truly independent unions for a fair share of productivity gains. 
And it recognized a further aspect of the new international economy: that low wages were 
not always a reflection of low productivity, particularly in the more sophisticated export 
sectors of the economy (Shaiken, 1993).    
Instead of understanding these initiatives for what they are -- an attempt by national 
political leaders to lead their countries to a new broad-based social and political 
consensus capable of underpinning a more open international trade and investment 
regime -- the World Development Report dismisses them as a mere cover for potential 
protectionist hijackers, the consequence of a "small but vocal minority" driven by fear of 
losing out. In so doing, the WDR reveals its own limitations: a report written by people 
out of touch with the deep social and political currents running in a number of the Bank's 
major non-borrowing countries. As support weakens in these countries for future 
financing of the World Bank, as it already has, the Bank should consider whether it is not 
contributing to this sentiment by its one-sided development strategy that emphasizes 
removal of barriers to investment capital but denigrates the concerns of workers in the 
industrialized countries and ignores the degraded workplace and environmental 
conditions that permeate the experience of workers in too many of its borrowing member 
countries.    
B. THE WDR's ANALYSIS OF UNIONS AND INCOME INEQUALITY    
There is an almost schizophrenic character to the WDR's discussion of the role of unions 
in the formal labor sector of the economy and their relationship to poverty and income 
conditions among the rural and urban poor. The report forthrightly states that, "[f]ree 
trade unions who can bargain collectively with employers are a cornerstone of any 
effective system of industrial relations which tries to strike a balance between the need to 
maintain enterprise competitiveness and workers' aspirations for higher standards" (p. 
79).    
But the report also blames urbanized union workers for the plight of the urban and rural 
poor: "In some countries, they behave as monopolists, protecting a minority group of 
well-off unionized workers at the expense of the unemployed and those in rural and 
informal markets, whose formal sector employment opportunities are correspondingly 
reduced" (p. 80).    
At the same time, according to the WDR, that non-union, less-privileged sector is 
essential to discipline excesses of the unionized wage sector: ..."[a] competitive non-
union labor market could exert discipline on the monopolistic wage practices of 
unionism. If the state encumbers the non-union sector with regulations on minimum 
wages and restrictions on hiring and firing, the sector will operate much less effectively 
as a constraint on unions' wage demands" (pp. 82-3).    
In other words, says the report, an informal non-unionized rural and urban labor sector, 
characterized by low wages and low workplace standards, is necessary to discipline the 
formal unionized sector, and for that to occur the informal sector should not be 
"burdened" with minimum-wage or hiring and firing restrictions. But if the informal 
sector is then denied "higher wages, greater job security, and better working conditions", 
this, according to the report, is the fault of unions, colluding with government and firms, 
in the organized sector of the economy.    
In this bizarre view, the condition of the rural poor, primarily landless laborers, has little 
to do with land tenure arrangements, absence of rural credit and technical assistance, or 
the murderous intent of large landholders in such places as Northeast Brazil or the 
highlands of Guatemala, where it is common practice to assassinate rural union leaders 
and progressive priests. Nor, according to the report, does the plight of the urban poor 
have much to do with a steady stream of migrants from rural areas fleeing oppressive 
conditions, overwhelming urban services in the great metropolitan centers and willing to 
work for subsistence wages.    
The reality in many of the poor countries is quite different than that depicted by the 
WDR. Urban unionized workers are often the most forceful advocates for change that 
favors the poor in rural areas. In Brazil, in the 1994 Presidential election, the candidate of 
the Labor Party, a party based in large part on urban unionized labor, and the candidate 
himself a former union leader, was the one who most strongly advocated the need in 
Brazil for land reform, including land-tenure reform. This advocacy was not based simply 
upon idealism or considerations of social justice. Rather, it reflected enlightened self 
interest on the part of urban workers.    
In countries like Brazil, there is downward pressure on wages resulting from a continuous 
stream of emigration from rural areas to the great metropolitan and industrial production 
centers. An agrarian reform that slows down that migration by reforming land-tenure 
structures in favor of the landless rural poor is therefore in the interests of the unionized 
worker. The urban labor movement in Brazil has become the most formidable advocate, 
along with some elements of the Catholic Church, for agrarian reform that can benefit the 
rural poor.    
C. THE WDR-RECOMMENDED LABOR-RELATIONS REGIME    
Consistent with its pervasive fear of the perils inherent in strong unions, the WDR is 
sufficiently concerned to recommend a labor-relations regime that poses the least risk of 
a strong labor movement capable of having a voice in national economic policy and with 
the muscle to bargain for a fair share of the national economic pie. The report considers 
decentralized bargaining at the plant level the most desirable outcome: "If collective 
bargaining takes place at the enterprise or the plant level, the union's ability to effect 
monopolistic wage increases is tempered by the strong competitive pressures on the firm 
from the product market" (p. 83).    
In support of its decentralized, plant-level bargaining, labor-relations regime, the report 
cites, among other examples, Chile, Japan and South Korea. But plant-level bargaining is 
not without controversy in these countries. In Chile, the prevailing legislation was 
enacted during the military dictatorship of General Augusto Pinochet. Part of the price of 
Pinochet peacefully giving up power after losing an election was an agreement leaving in 
place the labor-relations regime, including the prevalence of plant-level bargaining. 
Indeed, the notable feature of the Chilean system is the priority it gives to individual 
worker contracts, even where there is a collective bargaining contract. This feature 
apparently is so attractive to the World Bank that it has attempted to negotiate its 
inclusion in revised labor legislation with borrowing countries (International 
Development Association, "Nicaragua: Second Economic Recovery Credit and IDA 
Reflows Supplemental Credit," 1994).    
With respect to Japan, the plant-level decentralized bargaining regime was the result of a 
larger struggle over the direction of post-war Japanese society and the degree to which 
genuinely democratic institutions would prevail. This struggle, and particularly the titanic 
battle involving the Nissan Motor Company, which resulted in Nissan's breaking its 
independent union, led by Tetsuo Masuda, with the tacit support of key American 
economic officials, has been detailed by David Halberstam: "Most significant was the 
death of Masuda's dream -- of an industry-wide union strong enough to stand up not just 
to one company but to the entire industry and indeed the state. From now on, each 
company would have its own union, which would be totally loyal to its parent company 
and dependent upon the marketplace success of the company for its success. Management 
had won; it could not go back to the pre-MacArthur days when there were no unions at 
all, but it had defined labor on its own terms, incorporated labor into the company itself, 
and ended any possibility of labor as an adversarial force within. Years later, when Japan 
finally challenged Western industries, it was clear that one of the most critical factors in 
its success was the creation of the second unions and the elimination of radical ones" 
(Halberstam, pp. 183-4).    
The ILO's World Employment 1995, however, observes that it is not at all clear that 
decentralized wage bargaining is a decisive factor in assuring sound macroeconomic 
performance (pp. 18-19, para. 46).    
The WDR is concerned that although, "[s]ome job security regulation may be needed to 
limit unfair practices...too much job security can discourage employment creation" (p. 
89). The Bank's recommended solution is for "[e]mployers and worker representatives to 
bargain over the remuneration package and be able to trade more severance pay for lower 
wages or less agreeable conditions. Under this framework, labor laws would announce 
the principle of income security through severance payments and perhaps define a 
minimum level without specifying the exact amounts which could differ across firms. 
Government's role would be to ensure that workers' rights to collective bargaining are 
protected and help settle disputes. Agreements reached in this way would have a better 
chance of balancing workers' desire for security with market realities and would be easier 
to enforce than legislated payments" (p. 90).    
But what if a union is not independent of government or company influence and acts 
more on their behalf than in the interests of the workers it is supposed to represent?    
The WDR assumes a near equal bargaining power between workers and companies and 
governments. More often than not, in too many of the Bank's borrowing member 
countries, this is not the case. MNCs, now in great demand in these countries, too often 
shamelessly exploit workers; and governments, increasingly dependent upon them for 
investment capital, prefer to look the other way rather than enforce the provisions of their 
own laws and constitutions that guarantee core worker rights.    
Nowhere is this more evident than in the maquiladora sector in Mexico. This sector is 
primarily located in Mexican towns on the border between the U.S. and Mexico. The 
maquiladoras are largely U.S. owned subsidiaries of major multinational corporations. 
They ship components to their Mexican subsidiaries, where they are assembled into 
finished products and returned to the United States under favorable tariff treatment. The 
workforce is largely composed of female employees.    
The experience of Ofelia Medrano is typical of what actually transpires at the plant level. 
A 23-year-old woman, she was hired by the maquiladora subsidiary of the Honeywell 
Corporation on July 7, 1993 and fired on November 25 for trying to organize an 
independent union. She testified before the U.S. National Administrative Office 
(USNAO), established under the NAALC. Each of the parties to the NAFTA (the U.S., 
Mexico and Canada) has established such an office to hear complaints concerning the 
alleged failure of another Party to the NAFTA to enforce its own labor laws.    
Medrano testified as to the conditions that led her to spearhead an attempt to form an 
independent union at the Honeywell plant: "Safety and hygiene conditions were not good, 
since we did not have the tools and security equipment that was necessary. One example 
is that we did not have sufficient extraction air fans, since we were working with paints, 
thinners, epoxy and dangerous chemicals. Sometimes this caused us to have headaches 
and nausea. They did not provide us with gloves, masks or belts. Sometimes we had to 
lift up to 10 or 15 kilograms, and several women hurt their waists" (Medrano, 1994, pp. 
34-5).    
Medrano initiated discussions with fellow workers about forming a union. The following 
week she was called into the office of management and asked who was organizing a 
union within the company: "I answered that I did not know. He asked me what my 
opinion was regarding the union and what benefits it would provide us. I answered that a 
union would provide us with better wages, better working conditions and better dealings 
with supervisors. And he responded by saying that in no way at all would he allow a 
union within the company, that first he would close the company before allowing one to 
enter" (Medrano, 1994, p. 36).    
Along with Medrano, twenty other female employees of Honeywell who had indicated an 
interest in forming such a union were fired. Along the border, the maquiladoras are well 
organized. Workers fired from one plant for union organizing are considered 
troublemakers and can rarely find work in other plants.    
Whatever the provisions of the Mexican Constitution, laws and international 
commitments, all of which nominally afford Mexican workers reasonable job security 
guarantees, MNCs and Mexican companies can arbitrarily discharge workers on the most 
flimsy of pretexts. The dispute resolution bodies -- Arbitration and Conciliation 
Commissions (CABs), whose members are appointed by the government and the 
dominant trade union federation, the CTM, are stacked against the workers.    
Often, the CABs use the Mexican legal requirement that unions be registered with them 
to frustrate the registration of unions truly independent of government and company 
control. This was the case with Mexican workers of Magneticos de Mexico, the 
maquiladora owned by the Sony Corporation. The USNAO determined in a hearing held 
in San Antonio, Texas, in connection with a complaint initiated on behalf of the workers, 
that their attempt to register an independent union had been denied by the CAB on 
spurious grounds (USNAO Report, Submission # 94003).    
It is virtually certain that had Mexico used a registration requirement to frustrate the entry 
of foreign capital, the World Bank would have conditioned future lending to Mexico 
upon the removal of such a barrier. Indeed, as previously noted, World Bank 
"conditionality" has been directed in Mexico (as elsewhere in Latin America) towards 
one objective: facilitating the entry of investment capital and has ignored the abusive 
labor practices exemplified in the Medrano and Magneticos cases (Levinson, 1994). It 
has never, for example, as far as is publicly known, ever raised the issue of obstacles to 
the formation, including the registration requirement, of independent trade unions in its 
on-going dialogue with government authorities over development policies and priorities.    
The Mexican Government, because of its increasing dependence upon foreign capital, is 
not only incapacitated from enforcing its own job-protection laws to prevent abuses by 
the companies; it has become a partner of the companies in intimidating workers to 
abandon their constitutional, legal and international right of free association.    
What is missing from the WDR is any recognition of the nexus between the development 
model promoted by the Bank (and the IMF), with its dependence upon attracting FDI, 
and the labor abuses that are becoming increasingly endemic among its principal 
borrowers. Mexico and Indonesia are among the World Bank's largest borrowers, but the 
Bank has never defined country performance, which governs the Bank's decision as to 
how much resources a country may expect to receive from the Bank, to include respect 
for core worker rights.    
The Bank has steadfastly refused to admit that the labor-relations regime is as important a 
part of the investment environment as the financial rules governing investments. The 
Bank, and, in Latin America, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), have tacitly 
accepted such labor abuses as an integral part of the strategy of attracting FDI (Levinson, 
1994).    
The WDR seems to be oblivious to the disproportion in power between workers and 
management in most of its borrowing member countries. In a situation where the plight 
of workers like Medrano and the Magneticos workers is more the norm than the 
exception, the report is obsessed by potential union abuses of "monopoly" power. Its 
recommendations --decentralized wage bargaining and not too much job security 
protection -- are consequently designed not to assure the protection of core worker rights 
in its borrowing member countries, but to limit the ability of workers to protect those 
rights through effective collective bargaining.    
D. GROWING INCOME INEQUALITY AND CONCENTRATION OF 
ECONOMIC POWER    
The WDR is sensitive to the charge that the policy reforms sponsored by the World Bank 
have contributed to a growing income inequality in Latin America, but it is reluctant to 
admit that such growing inequalities are a consequence of these reforms (p. 56). Yet, one 
of the strongest boosters of the Salinas government reforms in Mexico has candidly 
admitted, "Mr Salinas's economic policies have widened already huge disparities of 
wealth... Some have grown rich from a privatization program which brought large capital 
sums to the state but which also converted public monopolies into private ones" 
(Economist, 1994).    
And the World Bank's own Latin America and Caribbean Region, in a June 1993 
confidential strategy paper on Mexico, acknowledged the link between growing income 
inequality and policies of the Salinas government, policies which the World Bank has 
enthusiastically supported and financed. It noted that the continued viability of the 
economic program would depend upon "how the government responds to chronic poverty 
-- and to the possibly more visible and politically charged problem of a policy-induced 
deterioration in the distribution of income" (World Bank, 1993a, p. 9). What is true of 
Mexico has also been occurring in Argentina and elsewhere in Latin America.    
These candid observations concerning the link between policies supported by the Bank 
and growing income inequality and concentration of economic power are in striking 
contrast to the denials of such linkage by the WDR. In this context, the case for strong 
independent unions that can negotiate on behalf of their membership for a fair share of 
productivity gains and thus assure a wider distribution of such gains is particularly 
compelling.    
E. LABOR MARKET FLEXIBILITY AND THE DEBATE OVER THE CAUSES 
OF RISING UNEMPLOYMENT  
The WDR analysis and recommendations mirror an on-going debate in both 
industrialized and developing countries as to the causes of seemingly intractable 
unemployment. An influential body of opinion considers differences in labor-market 
regulation to be the central explanation of contrasting employment performance across 
countries. This debate has most prominently centered around the contrasting 
performances of the U.S. and West European economies.    
Labor-market rigidity in Europe -- strong unions, stringent employment protection, 
generous welfare provisions -- in contrast to the relatively unregulated labor market in the 
United States, is blamed for poor employment performance in Europe (Washington Post, 
Editorial, May 17, 1995).    
Concern with alleged labor-market rigidities underlies, as well, the analysis and 
recommendations of the WDR, which emphasizes the importance of flexible labor 
markets: "Adaptable labor markets are essential if workers are to benefit quickly from 
economic recovery, and increased labor market flexibility is an important part of the 
adaptability agenda. Increasing labor market flexibility -- despite the bad name it has 
acquired as a euphemism for pushing wages down and workers out -- is essential in all 
the regions of the world undergoing reforms... Many of the necessary reforms will 
involve special, large layoff operations, or liberalizing complementary markets, 
especially the housing market. But the most important reforms involve lifting constraints 
on labor mobility and wage flexibility, as well as breaking the ties between social 
services and labor contracts" (p. 109).    
Perhaps, however, the "bad name" it has acquired is deserved and is a reflection of the 
one-sided emphasis of the Bank in its recommended development strategy of creating 
conditions conducive to attracting capital instead of a more balanced approach that 
recognizes the importance of core worker rights.    
World Employment 1995, moreover, suggests that "labour market rigidities have not been 
an underlying cause of past labour market performance" (p. 20, para. 51). It observes, 
"Labour market performance has deteriorated since the first oil shock irrespective of 
differences in labour market regulation, suggesting that a more fundamental common 
factor (or factors) has been at work. International shifts in trade, employment and 
technology could be among these causes of deteriorating labour market performance. The 
manifestations of this deterioration have, however, differed, taking the form of rising 
inequality and falling wages in the less regulated United States labour market and high 
unemployment in the more regulated European setting. In any case, even if the issue of 
ultimate causation is left aside it remains debatable whether it is regulation of the labour 
market that has been the main impediment to job creation."    
And it further notes that "[a] purely (or mainly) deregulatory route to greater labour 
market flexibility will not be a panacea. Far from being a simple solution that confers 
only benefits it is likely to involve a trade-off in terms of greater inequality and poverty. 
It will also involve the sacrifice of the considerable benefits that flow from appropriately 
regulated markets" (p. 22, para. 56). Those benefits include the propensity of firms to 
train and the willingness of workers to invest in upgrading their skills when employment 
security exists (p. 22, para. 57).    
World Employment 1995 recognizes the advisability of labor-market reform, particularly 
with respect to the rigidity imposed by regulations on the length and organization of 
working time, but it also notes the importance of coordinated macroeconomic policy 
decisions among the major economies: "Most projections of long-term employment 
scenarios indicate that rates of growth higher than the trend since 1974 are required in 
order to restore full employment..."(p. 21, para. 53). And it argues that a "basis for policy 
coordination exists in the present conjuncture. The level of capacity utilization is 
generally low, making it unlikely that growth will be checked by supply constraints in the 
short run" (p. 21, para. 54).    
This debate over the relative importance of labor-market deregulation as a cause of 
unemployment is not likely to end soon. However, the World Bank has the means to 
enforce its view by making its lending to countries conditional upon their adopting the 
labor-market policies it favors. As the ILO World Employment 1995 notes, however, the 
labor-relations regime that the Bank is pressing upon its borrowing member countries 
may not be appropriate for them. On the contrary, rapid labor-market deregulation, in the 
circumstances that exist in too many of the Bank's borrowing member countries, where 
core worker rights are already weakly enforced, are likely to involve a trade-off that 
increases inequality and poverty.    
F. DEREGULATION AND DISCRIMINATION    
A major theme of the WDR is that relatively unregulated markets which minimize costs 
to employers are ultimately the most beneficial to workers, as they offer employers 
incentives to create jobs. The logic of this approach leads the report's authors to express 
reticence at introducing workplace standards and affirmative action to promote equal 
opportunity. "Anti-discrimination standards designed to help women are often difficult to 
enforce," according to the report, and too costly.    
In developing countries, anti-discrimination standards in the workplace have had many 
"unwelcome effects", according to the WDR, including:  
-- depression of female wages  
-- avoidance of female recruitment  
-- the practice of fixed-term contracts (to avoid paying maternity benefits)  
-- a requirement that women produce medical certificates attesting to their sterilization 
before hiring.    
Without offering evidence that anti-discrimination programs designed to correct just 
these abuses have in fact the opposite effect, the WDR presents these poor, unacceptable 
practices as an inevitable consequence of efforts to introduce gender-based standards in 
the workplace. The authors fail to take cognizance of the fact that even by their strict 
"magic of the market" logic, it would be counterproductive and inefficient for labor 
markets to discriminate against 50 percent of the potential workforce, and deny women 
opportunities to participate fully in active life. They also ignore the considerable body of 
progressive policy and regulation that have evolved over the years on gender issues. 
Examples abound of successful policies and affirmative action programs which seek to 
promote the full participation of women in the labor market, and the desegregation of 
workplaces.    
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